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Abstract 
In recent years Pamsimas (Penyediaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis 
Masyarakat / Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation) program 
has been promoted with a view to respond to the challenge of water 
shortages and sanitation in rural areas of Indonesia. Improved drinking 
water and sanitation facilities are presumed to enhance access to water 
resources and improve hygiene. In the meantime, the delegation of 
authority from the central to local governments in providing for people‟s 
basic needs (including water supply) became a condition of participation 
in the program. This paper presents the results of a case study of 
Pamsimas program as it was implemented in Tajuk Village, Semarang 
Regency. This paper is an extention of the previous study on the 
dynamic of water management in decentralization era. This update 
paper uses political economic and power analysis to understand farmers‟ 
decision in responding to the program. It is found that Pamsimas 
changed a set of institutional rules governing the use of water resources 
that are the adoption of water pricing mechanism and the establisment 
of a new collective choice body. It is argued that farmers‟ decisions to 
implement Pamsimas is not because of the hygienic practices and the 
importance of participation as narrated by the policy makers, but is 
entirely centered in the benefits of redistribution.    
Keywords: political economy, power, institutions, discourses, local 
institutional change, Pamsimas, collective action, common-pool 
resource, water management. 
 
KRITIS, Jurnal Studi Pembangunan Interdisiplin, Vol. XXVI No. 1, 2017: 47-74 
48 
Introduction 
Policy trend in various countries on natural resources today tends to 
delegate authority and control from the state to natural resources users (see 
Vermillion 1991). This delegation is usually concurrent with a policy of 
decentralization and transfer of state authority from central to local 
governments. The form of the programs varies from only increasing users‟ 
participation in management giving them representation as one of „the 
government‟s arms‟, to fully transfering responsibilities and control over the 
resources. In Indonesia, policy on water management used to employ the so-
called technocratic approaches, then this has also gradually given way to 
participatory approaches (see Vermillion et.al 2000, Arif and Murtiningrum 
2003, Pasandaran 2004). Since 1990s, the Government has supported the 
construction of water infrastructure to be managed by users through 
community-based water organizations. The programs take various names, 
such as community-based management of drinking and sanitation, 
community-based management of groundwater and irrigation, etc.  
One community-based program in water management at the village 
level is Pamsimas (Penyediaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat / 
Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation). It is facilitated by both the 
central and local governments of Indonesia, and supported by The World 
Bank. The main objective of the program is to provide drinking water and 
sanitation as a basic service to communities in rural and suburban areas. The 
scope of the program covers various activities, for example community 
empowerment and local institutional development to mention just a few. 
Based on the information on its website, Pamsimas I began in 2008 and ran 
till 2012, and was applied in 6,845 villages. These villages spread over 110 
regencies/cities with 6,303,468 drinking water users and 6,334,426 sanitation 
beneficiaries. The government continued with Pamsimas II program that ran 
from 2013 to 2016. It was planned that Pamsimas II was to be conducted in 
approximately 5,000 villages, 32 provinces, and 220 regencies/cities 
(pamsimas.org). Achieving this was regarded as the government‟s success in 
implementing the program.   
This study takes the village of Tajuk in Getasan Sub-district, 
Semarang Regency (see Figure 1 overleap) as a case-study which since 2013 
has implemented Pamsimas. With a mountain climate and a fertile highland, 
Getasan Sub-district is highly suited to the production of vegetables and 
tobacco. With up to 3997.54 ha area of non-rice field agricultural land, 
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vegetable production in Getasan is the largest in Semarang Regency. In 
addition to agricultural crops, Getasan is home to animal husbandry. Dairy 
cows can produce milk that exceeds 20 million liters per year. Furthermore, 
the amount of livestock manure in Getasan is more than 200 tons per year, 
which is used as fertilizer (BPS, 2015). So water use not only must meet the 
need of domestic users but also forms one of inputs of agricultural 
production. For many years most farming communities in Getasan have been 
self-governing in their water resources with barely any intervention from 
either government or non-governmental organizations. So, the dynamics of 
farmers in decision making in response to the implementation of Pamsimas is 
very interesting. Analyzing actions and decisions that have taken place, this 
study attempts to answer the question how farmers have responded to 
Pamsimas. 
This study used a qualitative approach in the perspectives of political 
economy and power. Political economy is as an economic methodology used 
to analyse institutions and political behavior (Weingast and Wittman, 2006). 
Meanwhile, power analysis is “approaches used by development and social 
change actors to better understand the ways in which different dimensions 
of power act to reinforce poverty and marginalisation and to identify actors, 
entry points and positive forms of power that can be mobilised in favour of 
desired changes” (Acosta and Pettit, 2013). 
The next section will cover the conceptual frameworks used in this 
paper. The following section will then discuss historical development 
affecting water use and management in the study area. Thereafter, collective 
water management in the study area will be discussed to understand the 
initial structure of the action arena. Subsequently, identifying the discourse 
and rules that have changed from traditional self-governing water system 
into Pamsimas will be reviewed. The next section discusses how farmer‟s 
debate in the decision making arena. Finally, the last section will present 
conclusions. 
KRITIS, Jurnal Studi Pembangunan Interdisiplin, Vol. XXVI No. 1, 2017: 47-74 
50 
Figure 1. Map of Indonesia, Central Java, Semarang Regency, Getasan Sub-district, 
and Tajuk Village 
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The Conceptual Frameworks  
Institutions and Institutional Change 
  The most commonly used definition of institutions is proposed by 
North (1990) who gives us “the „rules of game‟ that affect social behavior  
and are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They 
can be both formal and informal; and can be both created -like a 
constitution- or evolve over time -like common law- (North 1990, p.4). This 
thesis will use North‟s definition of institutions as the starting point that is a 
set of rules; but keep in mind that they are not simply constraints but also 
“incentives” shaping human interaction (see Bromley, 2006). Thus, in this 
study, institutions encompas the rules governing access to and use of water 
resources. 
Broadly speaking, institutional change occurs when outcomes of 
activities no longer correspond to expectations. North (1990) argues that 
institutional change occurs when current institutions are inefficient. 
Bromley (2006) places “volitional pragmatism” as the driver of institutional 
change whereby individuals imagine the outcomes of the future. In the 
context of resources, Ostrom (1990) argues that resource depletion may lead 
to institutional change. More specific in the field of irrigation system 
management, Tang (1992) argues that institutional change happens when 
individuals in a group are aware of the impact of the others‟ actions.   
In the debate over institutional change, it has been noted that 
institutions are interrelated and structured in several levels (Ostrom 1992, 
Wegerich 2001). Ostrom (1992, p.44) distinguishes between:  
(1) Constitutional rules: determining collective choice and operational 
choice procedures (including legitimizing who can join and what rules can 
be used);  
(2) Collective rules: constructing institution and making policy decision 
which affect operational choice; and,  
(3) Operational rules: implementing practical decisions as the consequences 
of collective rules. 
Discourses in Institutional Change 
Within the policy sciences, discourse has become increasingly 
important in the conceptualization of power in the political economy of 
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resources (see Escobar 1995, Hajer 1995, Wagerich 2001, Clement et.al 2007, 
Bixter et.al 2015). Hajer (2002) defines discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena; 
meaning is thus produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of 
practices” (p.63). It can be operated in the levels of global, national, and local 
by socially and culturally defined groups (Bixler et.al, 2015). 
Coming to an understanding of broader process and meaning of 
institutional change, it is worth considering discourse in the analysis 
(Wegerich, 2001). As Hajer (1995) argues when hidden meaning of terms 
within communication alter then the rules will change. Acosta and Pettit 
(2013) give an example that to streamline social change through laws, it is 
needed to equip them with internalised norms, attitudes and values.  
Common-pool Resources: a Case of Water 
  The term of common-pool resources can be easily understood when 
we compare the types of goods using two independent attributes: (1) 
“Exclusion”, and (2) “Subtractability/rivalry” (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 
1977). Exclusion means: goods/services (both provided by nature or 
individuals) differ in term of how easy or expensive it is to exclude other 
potential users. Subtractability means: goods/services valued by individuals 
also differ in terms of the degree of reduction of the goods availability. Based 
on those two attributes, goods/services can be classified into four types as 
figured in Tabel 1.  
Tabel 1 General Classification of Goods 
 Subtractability/rivalry 
Low High 
 
Exclusio
n 
 
Easy  
Toll goods 
i.e: TV cable, yoga group, etc. 
Private goods 
i.e: tree, bread, etc. 
Difficult/ 
Expensive 
 
Pure public goods 
i.e: public health service, street-
lighting, TV non-cable, etc. 
Common-pool resources  
i.e: forest, grassland, irrigation 
system, etc. 
Source: adapted from V. Ostrom dan E. Ostrom, 1977. 
We can see that toll goods are low in rivalry and easy to exclude 
them from other users. Private goods are high in rivalry and easy to exclude 
from other potential beneficiaries. Common-pool resources share the same 
characteristics with public goods, in terms of the difficulty to exclude 
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potential users. However, common-pool resources differ to pure public goods 
because when a public good is produced, a user does not compete with other 
potential users. For example, when someone benefits from using non-cable 
TV, it will not subtract the availability of the goods. Meanwhile, when 
common-pool resources produced, one user can substract the good 
availability from other users. Water used jointly in agricultural community 
has the characteristic of common-pool resources. For example, when a 
farmer uses a large amount of water from an irrigation system, he has 
substracted the availability of water from other farmers. Hence, the 
characteristic of common-pool resources may pose management problems, 
and institutional arrangements play an important role (see Ostrom 1990, 
Tang 1992, Ostrom et.al 1994).  
Institutional Arrangements for the Management of Common-Pool Resources 
“Coordination” and “property rights” are two important institutions 
for common-pool resources (Meinzen-dick, 2014: 3). The management of 
common-pool recources needs a coordinating mechanism which can be 
provided by state, collective action, and market (p.3). The state, for instance, 
can provide a public tank which supplies water for many houses. A group of 
farmers in collective action institution, for example, allows the distribution 
of water for the group. The example of coordinating mechanism provided by 
market is farmer selling/buying or trading water for agricultural purposes.  
Meanwhile, property right institution is defined “the benefit stream 
of resources to certain parties” (Bromley, 1992). Many resources are held 
under regimes which may combine the characteristics of two or more of 
these types: open-access regime, private property, state property, and 
communal/common property (see Berkes & Kislalioglu 1989, Bromley 2006). 
Open access regime or res nullius means there is no defined group of users or 
owners, so the asset is available to anyone. Meanwhile, private property 
means individual members of the political community have recognized 
rights to a benefit from the asset, subject to legislative mediation and judicial 
review. Another intitutional arrangement is state property, and this refers to 
the management of resources exclusively controlled by the central 
governments of nation states. Lastly, common-property refers to situations in 
which the resource is held or controlled by an identifiable community of 
users, including the rights to exclude non-owners (Bromley 1992, 2006, 
Berkes & Kislalioglu, 1989).  
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Collective Action and the Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
An ideal management of common-pool resources usually happens 
when users in the community work in a coordinated way to set operational 
rules, rather than act individually (see Ostrom 1990, Tang 1992, Wade 1994). 
However, in collective action, individuals may face some problems (see 
Marewell and Oliver, 1993). Colletive action problems are caused by the 
basic reason that “individuals will not act voluntarily that for common or 
group interests” (Olson, 1965).  
In the context of collective common-pool resources management, 
the prisoner‟s dilemma is often discussed. The prisoner‟s dilema is a paradox 
in decision analysis in which individuals acting in their own self-interest 
pursue a course of action that does not result in the ideal outcome (Hardin, 
1982). Prissoner‟s dilema is embodied in the choice as being either to 
cooperate or not to cooperate with others in rule of restrained access. Four 
arguments that each individual has, include: “(i) everyone else abides by the 
rule while the individual enjoys unrestrained access (he „free rides‟ or 
„shirks‟); (ii) everyone, including himself, follows the rule („cooperates‟); (iii) 
no one follows the rule; (iv) he follows the rule while no one else does (he is 
„suckered‟)” (Wade, 1994, p.201). Hardin (1968) calls the third outcome as a 
tragedy of the commons, whereby many individuals are involved and when 
they encounter difficulties in communication and then enforce rules among 
themselves. It is therefore collective decisions may produce outcomes 
harmful to the group as a whole without crafting endured principles for 
collective action (Ostrom, 1992).  
 
Historical Development Affecting Water Use and Management in the Study 
Area 
Land reform 
 In post-independence era, land reform in Indonesia can be traced 
back in 1960, when President Soekarno enacted Law No. 5 on Basic Rules of 
Agrarian Principles (Wiradi, 2000). The main purposes of the land reform 
were: (1) distributing land to farmers who did not own land, aiming to raise 
the production; and (2)  creating better prerequisites and conditions for 
farmers who cultivated lands owned by landlords, aiming to increase their 
income (Mubyarto, 1982). This law has been regarded as the important leap 
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for agrarian equality in Indonesia eventhough it could not be realized ideally 
as its purposes intended for.  
 Based on the 2013 agricultural census, the average of agricultural 
land holding in Getasan Sub-district is 3178.26 m2 per household. The 
acreage has decreased by 257.98 m2 from 2003, which then only amounted to 
2920.28 m2 (BPS, 2015). Land in the study area, Tajuk itself, is almost 
entirely held by local people, and only a very small portion is owned by 
people outside the village. The total area of the village is 1235.86 ha and it is 
utilised for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. Non-agricultural 
land is 734.33 ha; with 50.06 ha for houses/buildings; 37.17 ha of 
streams/cemetery/etc.; and 647.10 ha of state forest. Meanwhile, agricultural 
land is 501.53 ha in which the villagers highly depend on. In this context, 
water rights in Tajuk depend on the asset endowment, including land tenure. 
Economic policies encouraging commercialization of agriculture 
 With the launch of the Bimbingan Massal (Binmas – the Mass 
Guidence) and Instruksi Massal (Inmas – the Mass Instructions) Programs of 
the New Order era, and the implementation of the Green Revolution, the 
rural economy of Java experienced a new commercialization (Hüsken, 1989). 
At the macro or national level, the government viewed agricultural problems 
in economic terms (Mubyarto, 1982). If domestic food production is not 
sufficient for the minimum needs nationally, the government will set up 
programs to increase production. During the New Order era, such programs 
could be viewed through some general objectives of the Five-Year 
Development Plan (Repelita) in the agricultural sector. In Repelita I, II, and 
III (1969-1984) for example, agricultural development objectives were, 
among others, to promote the growth of food production, exports, and other 
industrial commodities; and specifically to increase labor productivity by 
enhancing land productivity. 
 These days, agricultural production in the study area is the highest in 
the regency as has been hilighted earlier. Therefore, water use must not only 
meet the needs of domestic use but also one of inputs for agricultural 
production. Farmers use water to feed livestock and clean up the stables. 
Despite the fact that agricultural crops do not particularly need water as they 
usually cultivated in the rainy season, agricultural crops are supplied by 
„virtual water‟ through the livestock manure used as fertilizers. 
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Policies of irrigation and water resources 
 In the context of irrigation in Indonesia, Act No.11 of 1974 
concerning irrigation has had a huge impact on economic and social life. 
Various water infrastructures were built for the needs of the population. The 
infrastructure development culminated in commercialization of agriculture, 
aiming at achieving food sufficiency. In the early 1980s, for example, Tajuk 
Village received support from the Presidential Aid Program (Banpres) in the 
form of tubes to transfer water from springs to people‟s settlements in the 
village. 
 In 2004, the government enacted Act No.7 of 2004 on Water 
Resources in efforts to solve problems on water supply. In fact, the 
enactment of the law provoked a variety of responses both pro and cons 
parties. The cons side hostile to the provisions of some articles that were 
considered promoting water privatization. They argued that the law altered, 
mostly for the worse, Indonesian society‟s welfare and rights as embodied in 
Act No.11 / 1974. Responding to this argument, in 2015 the Constitutional 
Court annulled the later law. Following the cancellation, the government is 
currently preparing the draft regulation which refers to Law No. 11/1974 on 
Irrigation, as the new reference replacing the Water Resources Act (Kompas, 
March 2, 2015). 
Changes in Institutional Control of Forest Resources and Access to Water 
Changes in the status of forest can mean changes in the institutional 
arrangement of the forest. When the status of forest is changed into a 
national park, then access, use, and control over agrarian resources in forest 
areas, which previously was a relationship of customary rights and culture, is 
replaced by the relationships of rights that are framed by modern 
conservation activities (study, research, visit, business tourism, etc.). In this 
context, there is a transformation of the de-facto customary property into a 
de jure state property, and the management and administration changes 
accordingly (Adiwibowo et.al, 2009). Hence, changes in institutional control 
over forest has an impact on the livelihood of communities living near or in 
the forest. 
Most of the people in Tajuk village have strong social and spiritual 
ties to the forests of Mount Merbabu because they have lived around the 
forest for generations. They are dependent on the forest resources, such as 
grass for fodder and water from springs which are often located in the forest 
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areas. In 1963, the government declared many Merbabu forests as protected 
forests and nature reserves. Most of these areas are also managed by 
Perhutani Ltd. and functioned as productive forest. Then since 2004 the 
central government, through the Ministry of Forestry, has taken over the 
management by setting the forest area as Taman Nasional Gunung Merbabu 
(Mount Merbabu National Park), which only strengthens the state-property 
regime.  
Decentralization / Local Autonomy Policy  
The political changes in Indonesia, along with the collapse of the 
centralized New Order government, have encouraged significant changes at 
all levels of government, including village administration. The changes were 
embodied in the regional autonomy policy, as mandated by Law 22 / 1999, 
and was later revised by Law 32 / 2004. Authority was granted to the local 
level government to organize and manage the concerns of society through 
their own initiatives based on community participation. The decentralization 
law was then reinforced by Law 33/2004 on Financial Balance between the 
Central Government and Local Government. The law grants full 
responsibility to regencies to provide basic services for the people in their 
respective regions, including drinking water and sanitation. Now village 
level authorities are getting stronger with the publication of Law 6/2014 on 
Villages that allows villages to manage their assets and resources, including  
springs located in the village area.  
 
The Initial Collective Water Management in Tajuk Village 
Land Tenure and Water Rights 
 Water rights are not written laws and there is no formal membership 
for accessing water. However rights to water in Tajuk are determined by, 
among others, land tenure and location of the source of water (usually 
springs). Water supply for each hamlet in Tajuk comes from mountain 
springs which permeates through soil surface or emerges on rocky layers. 
Springs occur haphazardly in Tajuk. They occur on:  
(1) land owned by individuals (private property). The owner has a 
right to determine who can access the water, whether it will be accessed by 
individuals or groups. In Tajuk Hamlet, for instance, there are springs 
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located on land owned by individuals, but the water can be accessed by other 
hamlets following lobbies and negotiations with the owner.  
(2) tanah bengkok, land owned by the local government or village 
(state property), which are controlled by the village apparatus as part of their 
remuneration. The water can be made used by the community in each 
hamlet, provided that the leader of the hamlet holding this bengkok gives 
conditional permission. An example of this can be found in Kaliajeng Hamlet 
of Tajuk Village. 
(3) forest area of Mount Merbabu National Park (MMNP state 
property). The water can be exploited by the hamlet commmunity living 
close to the forest. Even though the institutional arrangements for Mount 
Merbabu‟s forests have changed several times, the Tajuk continue to regard it 
as an enduring right to access water from these springs.  
Organization: „Hamlet Republic‟ 
Collective action concerning water resource management occurs 
independently in each dusun (hamlet / sub-village). Usually there is only one 
water supply system in each hamlet. With regard to water access and 
allocation, each hamlet will give priority to its own hamlet rather than to 
other hamlets. The independent management itself is formed according to 
physical features and administrative boundaries corresponding to the social 
identity of each hamlet. Physical boundaries that separate hamlets are rivers, 
farm land, and forests. The identity of hamlets is stronger than of village 
even though all these hamlets constitute the same village. The phrases such 
as Wong Pulihan or Wong Kaliajeng (Pulihan Halmet residents or Kaliajeng 
Hamlet residents), show that social identity is embedded in their collective 
memory. Other forms of social identity are embedded in their belief in 
origins and traditions which are unique, for example each hamlet celebrates 
saparan (a hamlet communal event) that is arranged and organized 
differently according Javanese calendar to respect their danyang (the 
hamlet‟s anchestor or the divine). 
Hamlets have their own characteristics in managing water resources. 
Some for example, utilize structural position such as the leaders of RT 
(Rukun Tetangga, literally neighborhood association or sub-hamlet level) 
and RW (Rukun Warga, literally community association or sub-village level) 
as water resources management organizations. Meanwhile, some others have 
formed a special team to manage water resources. In the decision making 
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related to water resource management, each hamlet uses almost the same 
mechanism that is through meetings in the RT and or RW. There are also 
several hamlets that utilize religious activities as a forum for decision-
making. Figure 2 shows sample of the structures of decision-making in water 
management in Tajuk. 
Figure 2. Collective Decision-making for Water Resource Management, Sample 
model from Pulihan Hamlet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: discussion with villagers 
 The organization of water management is also affected by other 
social capitals existing in each hamlet, for example leadership and other 
organizations (e.g. farmer unions/cooperatives) at the hamlet level. 
Influential leaders usually have more information, and are more skilled at 
water management, and therefore affect the outcome of decisions. Pulihan 
Hamlet, for instance, has a resident who works for MMNP so that he often 
gets information earlier than the others about all things pertaining to MMNP 
programs, such as forest or water conservation.  
Operation and Maintenance 
1) Water Allocation and Distribution 
Generally, there is only one water supply system in each hamlet, 
except in Sokowolu and Kaliajeng which have more than one system due to 
different geographic landscape of the settlements. The water systems in the 
village are characterized by simple technology which relies on gravity and 
does not require electric engine for water pump because water will 
automatically run to water tanks before the water is distributed to 
 Village leaders meeting  
(Head of hamlets and village office staff) 
Hamlet monthly meeting  
(Head of households in each hamlet) 
RT monthly meeting and incidental meeting 
(Head of households in each RT) 
Hamlet applies the meeting results (including transformation activities/cost, 
water access, allocation and distribution, transaction cost, etc.) 
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households through pipes. The disadvantage of the system is that it depends 
on the springs location which should be on higher area than the settlement. 
Ngroto Hamlet for instance, has springs located in its area but the 
community can not use the water since the springs location is lower than the 
location of the settlements and therefore the residents have to find water 
from other hamlet.  
Seasons affect the availability of water supply in the village, which in 
turn disturbs water allocation. In the rainy season people get an abundant 
water supply but they have less in dry season. Although there are no written 
rules, it is suggested not to use water for watering plants in the dry season as 
it can reduce water availability for household use. The unwritten rules, 
however, bring about „tail end problem‟ –water is used up in the higher areas 
before reaching the lower areas.  
2) Duties and Participation 
Unwritten rules concerning the duties and participation in the management 
of water resources vary from one hamlet to another. 
a. All water users collectively contribute to the initial investments to 
develop a water system. The amount of money contributed to the initial 
investment varies among users depending on their capability to afford it 
(usuk anda).  
b. All households joint collective labor (gotong royong) which is organized 
either at the RT or hamlet level. Some hamlets also apply sanctions for 
those who are absent from gotong royong. In Cengklok Hamlet, for 
instance, there is a mutual agreement that those who are absent in 
gotong royong without any permission will have to pay a fine at the 
amount of IDR 10,000. 
c. All hamlets except Macanan Hamlet apply regular payment scheme for 
water management. The schemes vary. Some hamlets apply flat charges 
for all water users no matter how much water they use. Other hamlets 
apply progressive payment –the more water the users use the more 
money they pay. In Gedong Hamlet, the community, for example agreed 
to pay IDR 1,000 per month and additional IDR 1,000 per head of 
livestock. 
All household heads may participate in the decision making process 
which is usually done at RT or hamlet meetings. However, not all people are 
able to express their opinions. In the cultural context, the major barrier to 
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participation is that only certain people, especially public figures, have the 
„courage‟ to give their opinions. Others are too „shy‟ to do this. The 
involvement of women in the decision-making in the meetings is also very 
little because the RT meetings are usually attended by men who are regarded 
as the leader of households.  
In the meetings, problems about any damage of the water system can 
be reported. The response to the reports varies depending on the degree of 
the damage. For instance, if it is a slight damage, only a few people, 
especially those who live near to the damage are appointed to fix it. On the 
contrary, if the damage is greater, then almost the whole hamlet‟s residents 
will carry out gotong royong. At the meeting, financial report of water 
management is also presented.  
General Outcomes: Water Availability and Collective Lobbying Activities 
Broadly speaking, the bio-physical condition of water resources and 
the simple technology of water system result in problem. For example, 
farmers in all hamlets living in the higher area and close to the springs use 
water inefficiently as highlighted earlier. In such circumstances water for 
lower area users is barely adequate in dry seasons. This is worsen by the lack 
of monitoring of infrastructur scheme in all hamlets which then brings the 
free-rider phenomenon into play.  
 Eventually access to water is also affected by transactional or lobbying 
actitivies done collectively between hamlets, or between individuals and 
hamlets. These can be achieved in the form of contractual agreement, 
compensation – ie payments, or some form of political transaction. The 
nature of these political transactions can be seen in the case of Macanan 
hamlet which does not have enough water. They voted a candidate of village 
leader from Pulihan Hamlet because he promised to give water access to the 
comunity of Macanan. Similar to the above agreement, the right for water 
access can be through lobbying and giving compensation to the land owner 
possesing springs. The community of Banaran hamlet, for instance, access 
water from Tajuk hamlet and pay a compensation every year.  
From „Traditional‟ Collective Management to Pamsimas 
There are three options offerred to villages and hamlets under 
Pamsimas program: 1) An expansion of development activities of new Water 
Supply and Sanitation (WSS) for villages that haven't had them before; 2) 
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Optimization i.e. WSS maintenance and improvement activities to increase 
the number of beneficiaries; 3) capacity development activities of the villages 
that already have WSS but aim to increase the number of beneficiaries. The 
budget allocation for the construction of the three options varies from one 
village to another, but it is constrained by a maximum budget of IDR 250 
million per village.  
The following are the discourses and rules used in the policy 
implementation: 
Discourses 
The narrative of Pamsimas in Tajuk can be traced back to the 
national government‟s ambitions with regard to clean drinking water supply 
and sanitation. From the government‟s side, Pamsimas is based on the 
Indonesian Government's commitment to the Millennium Development 
Goals for the Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS-MDG) which are developed 
by the United Nations. The program also refers to Law No.32/2004 of the 
Local Government and Law No.33/2004 of Financial Balance between 
Central and Local Governments. The former stipulates that the local 
government is fully responsible for providing basic services to their 
communities, including drinking water and sanitation. Thus the delegation 
of authority from the central to local government (the local authorities) 
becomes a discourse –driving Pamsimas.  
Pamsimas is also an effort to respond to water and sanitation 
challenges in Indonesia in this case is lack of access toward water supply and 
unhygienic sanitation behavior. One of the conclusions drawn by the policy 
makers was that many of the Government‟s efforts to improve the country‟s 
sanitation failed simply because of the government‟s ignorant dealing with 
the complexities of human behavior. Moreover, these programs focussed 
almost exclusively on the supply side of infrastructure, without considering 
the demand side (the World Bank, 2014). Hence, a community-based 
program which emphasises people‟s participation at the village level, both in 
decision making and implementation, could have the panacea to the 
numerous problems that occurred. 
Since 1990s the Government has been supporting the construction of 
water infrastructure to be managed by the users through community-based 
water organizations (MPW, 2011). In 1997, an ad hoc working group (Pokja) 
of drinking water and sanitation (Air Minum dan Penyehatan Lingkungan / 
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AMPL) was established under the Second Water Supply and Sanitation for 
Low Income Community (WSLIC) program, and created a communication 
and coordination forum to develop better drinking water and sanitation. The 
working group consisted of 8 Ministries and was supported by international 
donor agencies like the World Bank and the Australian DFAT (previously 
named Aus-AID). The programs coordinated by Pokja AMPL are mostly 
community-based programs, including Pamsimas, and they emphasize the 
importance of a participatory approach.  
Such institutional change implemented by the government of 
developing countries worldwide, including Indonesia, is connected with 
transnational donor agencies such as the World Bank and the Asia 
Development Bank to mention just a few (Vermillion et.al 2000, Li 2009, 
Suhardiman 2013). In Indonesia, the World Bank was instrumental in 
promoting participatory approaches in 1987 and they were reasserted in 
1999. Suhardiman (2013) noted that the policy was initially practiced under 
the Irrigation Operation and Maintenance Project (IOMP) 1987, which was 
essentially an agreement between the irrigation agency in the Ministry of 
Public Works and the World Bank as the major donor. Today the Bank 
supports not only the irrigation sector, but also the improvement of the 
supply of drinking water and sanitation. This happens both in urban and 
rural areas including the Third WSSLIC Project. 
Transnational donor agencies like the World Bank recognize that 
water resource management programs for economic growth and poverty 
reduction can not be achieved without „good governance‟ (see The World 
Bank, 1992). However, the Bank of course can not regulate the law of a 
sovereign nation such as Indonesia when promoting its programs. Li (2009) 
argues that “the Bank, however can use project rules, or what some have 
called the law of the project, as a tactic to educate and reform the practices of 
the target population and by adhering to them, project planners expect 
participants to learn new and better ways of living, and make them their 
own.” (Li, 2009:237). 
Institutional change in water management, which is supported by 
international donors, is questioned by some authors. Hadipuro (2010) for 
instance, argues that these changes in water program are undertaken by the 
Government of Indonesia to gain financial support from donors. Thus, water 
is utilized to attain funding. And water management is framed by foreign 
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intentions. Moreover, his study of five regions in Indonesia shows that 51-
98% of water resource budget is dominated by the Ministry of Public Works 
(Hadipuro, 2010). Meanwhile Siregar et.al (2004), argue that the loans 
provided by the Bank do, in fact,  influence policy in Indonesia, and in the 
process promoting open-market solutions. Indeed, the Government of 
Indonesia has been receiving loans from the World Bank to the amount of 
US $ 258.03 million, and this just for WSLIC Program (worldbank.org). 
Rules: Ex-post and Ex-ante  
The discourses of Pamsimas are embedded in „the rules of the project‟ 
of the program implementation, both ex-ante (prior to the implementation) 
and ex-post (after the implementation). In ex-ante, the targeted villages are 
required to follow rules which encourage hygienic sanitation, as these are 
the prerequisites of the grant. While in ex-post, the major dicourse 
entrenches the impetus to the efficient use of water, now only conceived as a 
commercial approach to cost recovery and water pricing. 
In order to get a grant of Pamsimas, the targeted villages have to 
fulfill all sorts of “rules of the project”. The criteria in pre-selection stage are: 
1) villages cannot get another Pamsimas grant; 2) access to safe drinking 
water is still poor (which is below 68.87%); 3) access to safe sanitation is still 
poor (which is below 62.41%); 4) The prevalence of diarrheal disease (or 
diseases transmitted through water and the environment) is high based on 
data from Puskesmas (the health center); 5) the cost per beneficiary is 
effective and efficient; 6) provide a Letter of Intent from the community to: 
(a) provide cadres of Community Empowerment (Kader Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat) in the field of WSS; (b) provide a contribution of at least 20% of 
the cost requirements, consisting of 4% in cash and 16% in kind, and (c) 
eliminate the habits of unhealthy sanitation (like improper toilet). 
The implementation of Pamsimas in Tajuk Village went thus: the 
Ministry of Public Works issued a Decree (SK) dated March 25, 2013 which 
announced a list of districts/cities which would become the targets of the 
Pamsimas Program. Semarang District Government offered Tajuk Village the 
opportunity to submit a proposal to obtain grants of Pamsimas. A team from 
the village then formed to work out a proposal. On July 2, 2013 Tajuk 
officially submitted the proposal to be included in the assessment of program 
grant recipients. The socialization was then conducted by village officers 
through meetings at the Village Hall, mosque, church, village chief's house, 
and the houses of citizens at events such as Bible or Koran studies. 
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In the assessment of optimization programs, Tajuk got the highest 
score. Subsequently, Semarang District Government responded to the Decree 
of MPW with a letter dated July 16, 2013, and this letter short listed the 
villages which were to be the target of Pamsimas. Tajuk was one of the 
villages that was listed as a recipient of a grant, that was to be funded within 
APBN (the state budget) at the value of Rp 216 million. However, this fund 
is only sufficient for 207 houses, whereas Tajuk itself has around 969 houses. 
Thus, the fund can only cover all Pulihan hamlet (140 houses) and partly 
Kaliajeng Hamlet (67 houses) with a water supply project. In addition 
healthy sanitation for schools is provided under the program for three 
elementary schools in Tajuk namely. 
The major rules with regard the programs under Pamsimas are: (1) 
the adoption of cost recovery measures and a water pricing mechanism; and 
(2) the establishment of a new collective-choice body.  
1) The adoption of cost recovery and a water pricing mechanism 
The narrative spreading in the targeted hamlets is that reducing water 
demand can be enforced by setting prices and introducing new technology 
so that water users will use it efficiently. As stated on the proposal of 
Pamsimas in Tajuk, it is important to enact a rule on distribution of cost 
recovery among water users in order to sustain the system. The rule should 
be supported by water pricing for efficiency and equity. A volumetric water 
price is decided in which the water charge is based on the amount of water 
used. Water meters are installed in each house to measure it, thus technology 
with the requisite support at the same time encompasses rule who can access 
water. Eventually, all water users have to pay IDR 1,000 per month, plus the 
price of water used which is IDR 200 per cubic meter of water. The 
imposition of the water charges started on April 1, 2014. The rules to be 
obeyed is that: if there is abundant water and farmers‟ water need has been 
fulfilled, other parties (outside village) may join Pamsimas and get water 
access. With this proviso: the rate for the business sector is IDR 1,000 per 
cubic meter of water. 
2) The establishment of a new collective-choice body 
Pamsimas has introduced new water management rules, with a transfer of 
control changes from leaders of RTs to Badan Pengelola Sistem Penyediaan 
Air Minum dan Sanitasi (BPSPAMS – The Management Agency of Water 
Supply and Sanitation System). This is the new collective decision-making 
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body. The members of the body constitute from selected local villagers. They 
attended training organized by the government among which: 1) Training of 
Construction Engineering of WSS, 2) Administrative Training, and 3) 
Training of Management Board. Therefore, the body becomes sort of „link‟ 
between village and the regency level government, and the members of the 
body are given earlier all information about the development of the program 
than the general public. They have authority over the day-to-day 
management, including operations and monitoring.  
 
Farmers‟ Debate in the Decision Making Process 
Local authorities promoted water sanitation, efficiency and 
community-based approach to justify the implementation of Pamsimas and 
to encourage villagers to accept the water management program. For 
instance, villagers were told that the water management program was being 
implemented for hygienic purposes and the introduction of public 
participation as stated by two local authorities: 
"Not all villagers have improper toilets. With Pamsimas, people want 
to build them. And the Health Center will provide the certificate of 
free BABS (Buang Air Besar Sembarangan / free careless defecation) 
for the village.” (Nur Azis, member of BPD, member of KKM Dharma 
Thirta).  
"The program is for the community and by the community. Even 
women will be involved in a participatory manner in the program.” 
(Samingan, Pulihan hamlet resident, working for MMNP).  
It was also claimed that there would be benefits by managing cost 
recovery through water pricing. In short, consumers must pay. The income 
would, allegedly, be used for the community‟s needs as stated by the chief of 
Pulihan hamlet: 
"With Pamsimas, the village would have an independent income that 
comes from the water" (Sugiyanto, chief of Pulihan hamlet). 
However the farmers‟ debate on the implementation in Tajuk was a 
classic prisoners‟ dilema. The decisions among them were flavoured with 
disputes among water users groups, especially on issues affecting farmers‟ 
self-interest. Hence, there arose a split of opinions among farmers as to the 
efficacy of the policy. The interviews with farmers suggested that water 
users‟ interests differ depending on endowments they have (see table.6). 
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Also, farmers‟ decisions with regard to Pamsimas were influenced by 
constraints in terms of time and their own feelings as to overturning 
structures built up by tradition and their forefathers. 
Table 6. Group Composition of Water Users 
Endowment 
Category 
Water Users Group Note 
Residency 
locations (altitude 
and spring 
locations) 
Higher and  lower areas Farmers living in higher areas have better 
water access since they are close to water 
tanks. 
Number of 
livestock 
Having relatively a few 
livestock (1-3) and many 
livestock (more than 3) 
Farmers having many livestock will use 
more water 
Political position 
and access to 
information 
Village elites (/officials), 
ordinary farmers, MMNP 
staff, rent seekers 
Hamlets having residents who have 
important positions get more information 
Identity Inside and outside village 
/ hamlet (other users) 
Residents of certain hamlets or villages get 
priority with water supply 
Source: interviews with farmers 
The decision, as to which hamlets the program targets, was 
influenced by the assets owned by each hamlet: water resources, political 
positions, access to information, etc. On the surface, the reason for deciding 
Pulihan hamlet was the abundance of spring water, and so technically the 
program will be more productive and more easily organized; and only those 
who were willing to accept Pamsimas‟ rules with regard to cost recovery and 
water pricing were eligible. However, it turns out other reasons related to 
political interests were involved. Local officials described Pamsimas as a 
positive change to a more modern system of water management. Interviews 
with all hamlet chiefs suggested that the decision was supported by village 
officials who are mostly from Pulihan. Most obviously the  village chief and 
village secretary live in Pulihan, thus almost all decisions by the higher 
levels of government are known first by the village elites, and they are 
Pulihan residents. 
Objections to Pamsimas came from several user groups i.e.: (1) 
farmers/households who live in higher area of settlement, (2) farmers who 
have relatively many livestock, and, (3) some farmers who were favoured by 
the earlier system. In the decision making forum, most of them argued that 
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water from the MMNP forest already belonged to the village, and so they 
shouldn‟t have to pay for their own water. Farmers living in the upper area 
have comparatively easier water access. This was due to the fact that they 
benefit from the biophysical condition of the resource and technology. They 
argued that there was no need to change the management since water was 
available to everyone. Some of them also argued that water was abundant, 
thus it was the fault of people living in lower area if they didn‟t have 
sufficient water. Moreover, farmers living many livestock disagreed with the 
program because they worried about higher water cost. It also appears that 
objections came from several people and organizations who previously got 
benefits from outside water users, like Salib Putih Foundation and „big‟ 
livestock industry.  
Meanwhile, those who supported Pamsimas implementation had 
their own concerns. Farmers in the lower area hoped to get more reliable 
and sufficient water as stated in the aim of the program. It is believed that 
water pricing and water meter technology as the structure employed 
supporting institutions should lead to more efficient water use, and therefore 
every household will save water and increase its availability. The new 
collective choice body was also hoped to minimize rent-seeking behaviour 
since the financial reports will be made public by the body; besides the 
disputes among farmers with regard to equality of water supply can be 
resolved. 
Eventually although some parties resisted the implementation of 
Pamsimas, they had to accept the program because of the constraints they 
faced. As the program assumed, the water use will be more equitable in 
distribution. It is thus, farmers who did not agree with the program could 
not resist (openly) because of moral considerations toward their fellow 
farmers who were seeking water equality. Meanwhile, in terms of timing the 
early socialization of Pamsimas occured only after the team submitted 
proposals to the district government. Further socialization was only 
conducted intensively after Tajuk village was confirmed to be one of the 
villages listed in the program. Thus, pressed by the urgency of the situation, 
farmers could not do anything else but agreed to it. They had to participate 
in the trial program and finally accepted the program on condition that 
water pricing would be decided participatorily by farmers, and not by 
outsiders, especially the upper level government.  
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Conclusion  
The perspectives of political economy and power have demonstrated 
that the relative success of the implementation of Pamsimas in the study area 
was due to various determinants (see figure 3). Although Pamsimas uses 
participatory approach and calls itself a community-based program, 
Pamsimas with its „rules of the project‟ can be regarded as „top-down‟ 
program. The study shows that the power of multinational donors is driving 
changes in institutions and altering the discourse at the local level regarding 
access to water resources. Within this case, the World Bank and United 
Nations have an important role in influencing national policy.  
We can identify that “changing institutions are being shaped by, and 
at the same time shaping, the discourses being used” (Bixter et.al, 2015). 
There are two discourses driving Pamsimas: (1) the realization of 
decentralization, and (2) response to the problem of water supply and 
sanitation. Meanwhile, two major rule changes have resulted from its 
implementation. They are: 1) the adoption of water pricing mechanism and 
the installation of new technology, and 2) the establishment of a new 
collective-choice body. These rules have guided water availabity within the 
system. Hence, in achieving water access for all Pamsimas has introduced a 
„market-like institution‟ within collective water management, where buyers 
and sellers undertake transactions over water (see Cummings, 1992).  
At the operational level, farmers‟ debates in the decision making 
forums with regard Pamsimas show a classic prisoners‟ dilema. It can be seen 
that farmers‟ responses in approving or disapproving the policy depend on 
“individual motivation and constrained by bounded rationality” (Tang, 
1992). Farmers‟ decision to implement Pamsimas did not occur because of a 
willing to improve water access/hygienic practices, nor was there an impetus 
to a fairer „community-based program‟, rather the debate in the decision-
making forum was centered mostly on the personal benefits of a 
redistribution.  
Eventually, it is possible to see that a majority, seeking regularity of 
supply and a distribution of benefit, outvoted entrenched and traditional 
interests. These votes took place with one side having vast resources and 
government support. It appears unlikely the participants in the new program 
are aware of commercial and cultural consequences of this „equality‟ in the 
market for water.  
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